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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

Case No. 940105-CA

v.
PERRY MCDONALD,

Priority No. 2

Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Defendant appeals from a conviction of aggravated robbery, a first degree felony,
in the Second Judicial District Court, Davis County, the Honorable Rodney S. Page presiding.
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (k) (1995).
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1. Did defendant knowingly and voluntarily waive hisrightto counsel?
This court will review the trial court's factualfindingssupporting a knowing and voluntary
waiver for clear error, the trial court's legal conclusions for correctness. State v. Tenney,
No. 930778-CA, slip op. at 3 (Utah App. Mar. 14, 1996).
2. Is a defendant who waives hisrightto counsel entitled to the effective assistance
of standby counsel?

This issue presents a purely legal question reviewed for correctness. State v. Pena,
869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
This appeal does not require the interpretation of any statutes, rules, or constitutional
provisions.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, under the name Terry Storman, was charged with two others on 21
June 1993 with aggravated robbery in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 and 76-3-203.1
(1992) (R. 14-15). Defendant was bound over after a preliminary hearing at which he was
represented by William Albright (R. 1).
Before trial, defendant indicated a desire to represent himself (R. 96). After a colloquy,
the court permitted defendant to represent himself and assigned Mr. Albright as standby
counsel (R.98-99). The jury found defendant guilty of aggravated robbery (R. 31). Defendant
was sentenced to a $10,000 fine and a term of five years to life with no enhancements (R.
37, 42-43). He timely appealed (R. 34).
The Supreme Court poured the case over to this Court (R. 513). By order dated 16
September 1994, this Court remanded pursuant to rule 23B, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure,
"for the limited purpose of entry offindingsof fact on appellant's claims that former counsel's

2

pre-trial actions constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court held a hearing
and entered findings of fact (R. 697, 703-08).l
STATEMENT OF FACTS2
The Crime
On 9 May 1993, at about 20 minutes before midnight, defendant and his companion
robbed the Arctic Circle restaurant in Clearfield, Utah (R. 129-36). Three employees were
there at thetime(R. 129-31). Defendant was armed with a handgun (R. 133). The robbers
got less than $300 (R. 140). Defendant thought the 22-year old manager was concealing
money and said to his companion, "I ought to cap her now for lying" (R. 135).
Self-Representation Issues
After the jury was impanelled at trial, the defendant requested to talk to the judge, and
a discussion was held in chambers (R. 93). Defendant stated:
I don't feel that I'm being properly counseled or as a lawyer being [sic], you know,
as far as discussing the matter, because for a fact, number one, he did not get in
touch with me any time during the week to even discuss or go over things. He
just, you know, like I come to court now, just to go to trial, then he comes and
says this and that, but we did not go over no battle plans or any such thing . . .
My lawyer did not go over any kind of battle plans or get me prepared for this.
He was going to make me a bargain, which I did not—I didn't want to take it.
So he did not come and discuss no common battle plans to me. I am not prepared.
I really think he is not prepared to go on in this case right now.

1

Defendant has abandoned the issues that formed the basis of his rule 23B remand.

2

Except as otherwise noted, record facts are stated "in the light most favorable to the
jury's verdict." State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, 117 (Utah 1989).
3

(R. 93-94). The court invited Mr. Albright to respond. He explained, "I take a position
opposite to that, and that puts me in an awkward situation, because I am here to represent
him" (R. 94). At the court's prompting, Mr. Albright summarized his trial preparation,
including at least three personal visits with defendant in the jail and at least eight telephone
calls with defendant and six with his relatives (R. 94-95). He reviewed with defendant "all
the evidence," including the preliminary hearing transcript and police reports (R. 95). Mr.
Albright had full access to the prosecutor's file and had discussed the case three or four
times with the prosecutor, including hearing the prosecutor's rendition of his trial evidence
(R. 95-96).
Defendant complained that "he has been prepared, but he hasn't prepared me" (R. 96).
In response to the court's questioning, he indicated that he intended to testify on his own
behalf (id.). The court replied, "Well, then, you have a right to go over that and there is
plenty of time to do that" (id.). There followed a colloquy concerning defendant's selfrepresentation:
MR. McDONALD: Do I have the right to go question, myself, the people
that he puts on the stand?
THE COURT: You can act as your own attorney if you want to.
MR. McDONALD: Okay[.]
MR. ALBRIGHT: I would be happy to sit there and advise him throughout
the trial, your Honor, if he prefers to represent himself.
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THE COURT: Do you prefer to represent yourself?
MR. McDONALD: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: I will allow you to do that and make your questioning. You
need to understand, however, that you will be required to abide by the same rules
of evidence as any attorney would be. Have you been to court before?
MR. McDONALD: Yes.
THE COURT: How many times have you been in court before? Have you
been through a trial?
MR. McDONALD: I have seen a trial before, yes, I have.
THE COURT: Have you personally been involved in one?
MR. McDONALD: Yes.
THE COURT: Have you been there when questions were asked and responses
were given?
MR. McDONALD: Yes, your Honor.
THE COURT: You have some knowledge then of the rules of evidence?
MR. McDONALD: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: And you know what's required in that regard?
MR. McDONALD: Yes.
THE COURT: You realize that this is a serious case and that the evidence
that would be presented is going to be critical in this matter?
MR. McDONALD: Yes.

5

THE COURT: Knowing that, is it still your desire to proceed and act as your
own attorney?
MR. McDONALD: Yes.
THE COURT: How much education have you had, Mr. McDonald?
MR. McDONALD: I graduated, your Honor.
THE COURT: From what?
MR. McDONALD: From high school.
THE COURT: Have you had any college experience?
MR. McDONALD: No, sir.
THE COURT: Do you read, write and understand the English language?
MR. McDONALD: Yes.
THE COURT: And you appear to be very articulate, is that true?
MR. McDONALD: Yes.
THE COURT: Well, you have a right to act as your own attorney, but I will
ask Mr. Albright to be here.
MR. McDONALD: Yes. I would like for him to be there.
THE COURT: Would you like him to make your opening argument for you?
MR. McDONALD: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: All right. You can proceed and I will ask you to—you may
ask questions or may ask him to ask them for you, however you feel most
comfortable.

6

MR. McDONALD: Okay.
THE COURT: But he will remain there and be there to assist you at any time.
MR. McDONALD: Okay.
(R. 96-99).
Defendant later decided to make his own opening statement (R. 120). His opening
statement began as follows:
MR. McDONALD: Good morning. My name is Perry McDonald, and I [am]
prepare[d] to defend myself on this case, on the aggravated robbery. The evidence
that the DA gave here is indeed evidence that a robbery had occurred at an Arctic
Circle, but me and Dwayne Johnson did not have nothing to do with this robbery,
and I will give you the story as it should be really told and the true story.
(R. 120). Defendant continued with a detailed but unsworn narration of his version of the
facts (R. 120-26).
After the presentation of evidence, Mr. Albright asked to be excused from closing
arguments to attend a preliminary hearing in another matter, but the court denied his request:
"I think we need you here, Mr. Albright. The reason for that, there may come up some
things in the course of the closing argument by the prosecution that Mr. McDonald may
want some consultation on and I would like you available for that" (R. 462); cf. Br. of Aplt.
at 18.

7

In closing argument, defendant correctly identified his potential sentence as "five to
life" (R. 480). He also in effect testified that "I did not do this crime, that I—I mean really
I did not do this crime that is being put upon me" (id.).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Under the totality of circumstances test, the record demonstrates that defendant
knew of the dangers and disadvantages of self-representation when he demanded to represent
himself. He was informed of the charges against him and had previous experience in court.
In addition, defendant's own performance at trial showed legal sophistication.
Defendant's plain error claim that he was denied his right to effective, conflict-free
standby counsel fails because (1) a defendant waivingrightto counsel has norightto standby
counsel of any sort; and (2) defendant has failed to identify a conflict of interest here.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
DEFENDANT KNOWINGLY AND VOLUNTARILY WAIVED HIS
RIGHT TO COUNSEL
Defendant's primary claim is that he did not knowingly, intelligently, and
voluntarily waive his Sixth Amendment right to counsel in the trial court. Br. of Aplt.
at 20.
Since defendant expressly declined counsel appointed by the trial court, "he has
the burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that he did not so waive this
8

right." State v. Frampton, 131 P.2d 183, 187 (Utah 1987) {citing Moore v. Michigan,
355 U.S. 155, 161-62 (1957)). Accord State v. Hamilton, 732 P.2d 505, 507 (Utah
1986) (per curiam); United States v. Williamson, 806 F.2d 216, 220 (10th Cir. 1986).
The Sixth Amendment right to counsel implies a right to represent oneself in a
criminal trial. Faretta v. California, All U.S. 806, 834-36, 95 S. Ct. 2525, 2541
(1975), State v. Tenney, No. 930778-CA, slip op. at 3 (Utah App. Mar. 14, 1996).
However, "the exercise of the right of self-representation necessarily constitutes a
waiver of the right to counsel." State v. Bakalov, 849 P.2d 629, 633 (Utah App. 1993)
(opinion of Greenwood, J.), approved on cert, by 862 P.2d. 1354, 1355 (Utah 1993)
(per curiam); accord Faretta, All U.S. at 835).
Hence, the trial court has a duty "to determine if this waiver is a voluntary one
which is knowingly and intelligently made." State v. Frampton, 131 P.2d 183, 187
(Utah 1987). Defendant "should be made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of
self-representation, so that the record will establish that 'he knows what he is doing and
his choice is made with eyes open.'" Faretta, All U.S. at 835 (quoting Adams v.
United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279 (1942)).
"Ideally, the trial judge should conduct a thorough and comprehensive formal
inquiry of the defendant on the record to demonstrate that the defendant is aware of the
nature of the charges, the range of allowable punishments and possible defenses, and is
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fully informed of the risks of proceeding pro se." United States v. Willie, 941 F.2d
1384, 1388 (10th Cir. 1991), cert, denied, 502 U.S. 1106 (1992). Accord Frarnpton,
12H P.2d at 187 (colloquy on the record is preferred method);3 Tenney, slip op. at 3.
3

"As a guide," the Frarnpton court quoted from the Bench Book for United States District
Court Judges, vol. 1 §§ 1.02-2 to -5 (Federal Judicial Center, 3d ed. 1986), which provides:
An accused has a constitutional right to represent himself if he chooses
to do so. A defendant's waiver of counsel must, however, be knowing and
voluntary. This means that you must make clear on the record that the defendant
is fully aware of the hazards that he faces and the disadvantages of
self-representation.
When a defendant states that he wishes to represent himself, you should
therefore ask questions similar to the following:
(a) Have you ever studied law?
(b) Have you ever represented yourself or any other defendant in a
criminal action?
(c) You realize, do you not, that you are charged with these crimes:
(Here state the crimes with which the defendant is charged.)
(d) You realize, do you not, that if you are found guilty of the crime
charged in Count I, the court. . . could sentence you to as much as
years
in prison and fine you as much as $ ? (Then ask him a similar question with
respect to each other crime with which he may be charged in the indictment or
information.)
(e) You realize, do you not, that if you are found guilty of more than
one of those crimes this court can order that the sentences be served
consecutively, that is, one after another?
(f) You realize, do you not, that if you represent yourself, you are on
your own? I cannot tell you how you should try your case or even advise you as
to how to try your case.
(g) Are you familiar with the . . . Rules of Evidence?
(h) You realize, do you not, that the . . . Rules of Evidence govern what
evidence may or may not be introduced at trial and, in representing yourself,
you must abide by those rules?
(i) Are you familiar with the . . . Rules of Criminal Procedure?
(j) You realize, do you not, that those rules govern the way in which a
criminal action is tried in . . . court?
(k) You realize, do you not, that if you decide to take the witness stand,
(continued...)

10

However, "a specific warning on the record of the dangers and disadvantages of
self-representation is not an absolute necessity in every case if the record shows that the
defendant had this required knowledge from other sources. n Meyer v. Sargent, 854
F.2d 1110, 1114 (8th Cir. 1988). Accord Fitzpatrick v. Wainwright, 800F.2d 1057,
1066 (11th Cir. 1986) (holding that Faretta requirements were met without colloquy
addressing defendant's "understanding of the risks of self-representation").
tt

[A]bsent such a colloquy . . . [the appellate court] will look at any evidence in

the record which shows a defendant's actual awareness of the risks of proceeding pro
3

(...continued)
you must present your testimony by asking questions of yourself? You cannot
just take the stand and tell your story. You must proceed question by question
through your testimony.
(1) (Then say to the defendant something to this effect): I must advise
you that in my opinion you would be far better defended by a trained lawyer
than you can be by yourself. I think it is unwise of you to try to represent
yourself. You are not familiar with the law. You are not familiar with court
procedure. You are not familiar with the Rules of Evidence. I would strongly
urge you not to try to represent yourself.
(m) Now, in light of the penalty that you might suffer if you are found
guilty and in light of all the difficulties of representing yourself, is it still your
desire to represent yourself and to give up your right to be represented by a
lawyer?
(n) Is your decision entirely voluntary on your part?
(o) If the answers to the two preceding questions are in the affirmative,
you should then say something to the following effect: "I find that the defendant
has knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel. I will therefore
permit him to represent himself."
(p) You should consider the appointment of standby counsel to assist the
defendant and to replace him if the court should determine during trial that the
defendant can no longer be permitted to represent himself.

Frampton, 737 P.2d at 187-88 n.12.
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se." Frampton, 737 P.2d at 188. "[T]he record must somehow otherwise show that
the defendant understood the seriousness of the charges and knew the possible
maximum penalty. The record should also show that the defendant was aware of the
existence of technical rules and that presenting a defense is not just a matter of telling
one's story." Id. "The ultimate test is not the trial court's express advice, but rather
the defendant's understanding." Fitzpatrick, 800 F.2d at 1065.
"In this regard, whether a knowing and intelligent waiver has been made turns
upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding each case." Frampton, 737
P.2d at 188. Accord Willie, 941 F.2d at 1389; Meyer v. Sargent, 854 F.2d 1110,
1114 (8th Cir. 1988). The court may inquire into the "totality of the circumstances,
including the background, experience, and conduct of the defendant," Williamson, 806
F.2d at 220; various factors have been considered in addition to those mentioned.
Education and family. A defendant's educational level and the presence of
family members may be relevant factors. See Williamson, 806 F.2d at 220
(considering defendant's education and presence of defendant's parents in upholding
waiver of counsel). See also United States v. Hafen, 726 F.2d 21, 25 (1st Cir.), cert,
denied, 466 U.S. 962 (1984).
Prior legal experience. A defendant may have "had previous contact with the
criminal justice system sufficient to give him a general knowledge of the dangers and

12

disadvantages of self-representation." Meyer, 854 F.2d at 1114-15 (relying in part on
defendant's reference to "legal technicalities that I do not understand"). In Frampton,
the supreme court noted that "[t]he value of counsel should have been apparent to
defendant" based on his prior prosecution for the same offense. 737 P.2d at 189.
Standby counsel. Similarly, u[t]he fact that the trial court insisted upon
appointing standby counsel must have imparted to defendant the seriousness of the
charges pending against him." Id. at 189 n.19.
Pretrial proceedings. Pretrial proceedings, including arraignment, may be
relevant to whether a defendant's waiver was knowing and intelligent. See Willie, 941
F.2d 1384 (relying in part on arraignment to establish knowing and intelligent waiver
of right to counsel).
Representation before trial. "Another factor courts consider in determining
whether the risks of a pro se defense are understood is whether a defendant is
represented by counsel before trial." Fitzpatrick 800 F.2d at 1066 (holding that Faretta
requirements were met in waiver of counsel).
Conduct at trial. An appellate court may consider whether defendant's "conduct
at the trial" tended to show "that he had a good knowledge of the criminal justice
system." Meyer, 854 F.2d at 1115. United States v. Hafen, 726 F.2d 21, 25 (1st
Cir.), cert, denied, 466 U.S. 962 (1984) (noting that defendant "efforts in his own
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behalf were not "wholly incompetent"). Thus, for example, this Court in Tenney
rested its conclusion that defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his
right to counsel on defendant's statements "on the fourth day of trial" and the fact that
he "conducted himself ably during t r i a l . . . " Tenney, slip op. at 4-5.
Here defendant's colloquy was fairly thorough. He was told that he had the right
to represent himself; that he would "be required to abide by the same rules of evidence
as any attorney would be"; and that his was a serious case in which critical evidence
would be presented. The court ascertained that defendant had been personally involved
in a previous trial; that he had observed the giving of testimony in the question-andanswer format; that he had a rudimentary knowledge of the rules of evidence; that he
was a high school graduate; that he was literate and fluent in English; and that he could
have his standby counsel conduct examination or argument for him (R. 96-99).
Looking beyond the formal colloquy, many of the circumstantial factors identified
above were present in this case. From the preliminary hearing and arraignment
defendant was aware of the charges against him and the penalty he faced (R. 17, 520623). In fact, in his opening statement, defendant informed the jury, "this is a five to
life, okay" (R. 125). Defendant had previous legal experience, having been
"personally involved" in a prior trial (R. 40). And of course, defendant was
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represented before trial and had standby counsel throughout trial, including during
closing arguments (R. 360, 462).
In addition, defendant's trial performance was at times impressive for a layman.
Consider the following cross-examination of an eyewitnesses:
O. Okay. Did you give any facial descriptions of the person that took
your money?

A. Yes, I did.
Q. Except for other than bony face?
A. No, I don't think so.
Q. Did this person have a beard?
A. I didn't say. I couldn't remember.
Q. Did this person have a mustache?
A. I didn't say.
Q. Did this person have any scars on his face?
A. I couldn't tell.
Q. Did you see the color of this person's eyes?
A. No, I didn't.
Q. Did you see any tattoos or anything?
A. No, I didn't.
Q. Did you see this person have a gun?
15

A. I didn't. I don't recall seeing one.
Q. But yet you still can see that the person was me?
A. Yes.
MR. McDONALD: Okay. Thank you.
(R. 180).4
Defendant was able to examine his codefendant Dwayne Johnson over objection
from Johnson's counsel (R. 359-71). Johnson's testimony, if believed, would have
exonerated both defendants {see R. 365-67). Defendant's stratagem left Johnson's
attorney in the position of cross-examining his own client (R. 372).
Defendant's thorough knowledge of police reports and the preliminary hearing
transcript are apparent from his use of them in opening statement and witness
examinations {see R. 123-25, 172-74, 424-25). In fact, he forced at least one witness
to admit that a statement in her police report was "a mistake" (R. 174).
Near the conclusion of trial, the trial judge said to defendant, "I think you have
done very well representing yourself. You have asked relevant questions and you have
done a good job" (R. 462).

4

Defendant seems to have adevelop[ed] an instinct for" Cicero's Ninth Commandment:
"Avoid one question too many." Irving Younger, A Letter in Which Cicero Lays Down the
Ten Commandments of Cross-Examination, LITIGATION, Winter 1977 at 18.
16

Finally, defendant's waiver was not "a result of coercion or mistreatment of the
defendant." Fitzpatrick 800 F.2d at 1067. Although at trial defendant complained that
his attorney was unprepared, on appeal he does not claim that his election to represent
himself was involuntary in the sense that he was forced to choose between selfrepresentation and ineffective appointed counsel. Cf. United States v. Bur son, 952
F.2d 1196, 1199 (10th Cir. 1991) (rejecting involuntariness claim on the ground that
defendant failed to show good cause for dissatisfaction with his appointed counsel),
cert, denied, 503 U.S. 997 (1992). Indeed, defendant welcomed Mr. Albright to act as
his standby counsel, stating, "I would like for him to be there" (R. 98).
In sum, defendant has failed to carry his "burden of showing by a preponderance
of the evidence" that he did not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive his right
to counsel. Frampton, 131 P.2d at 187. The record in this case shows that defendant
"understood the seriousness of the charges and knew the possible maximum penalty."
Id. at 188. He "was aware of the existence of technical rules and that presenting a
defense is not just a matter of telling one's story." Id. The "totality of the
circumstances, including the background, experience, and conduct of the defendant,"
Williamson, 806 F.2d at 220, confirm that defendant understood "the dangers and
disadvantages of self-representation," and that "he [knew] what he [was] doing and his
choice [was] made with eyes open." Faretta, All U.S. at 835.
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POINT n
DEFENDANT HAS FAILED TO ESTABLISH EITHER THE RIGHT
TO EFFECTIVE STANDBY COUNSEL OR THAT HIS STANDBY
COUNSEL LABORED UNDER AN ACTUAL CONFLICT OF
INTEREST
Defendant claims that his right to self-representation was violated by the
appointment of standby counsel laboring under an actual conflict of interest. Br. of
Aplt. at 37.
Defendant asserts without authority that "the Sixth Amendment right to selfrepresentation can be violated, per se, by an actual conflict of interest between standby
counsel and the client." Br. of Aplt. at 39. Defendant claims support for this
proposition from Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 692 (1984). However,
Strickland neither states nor implies this proposition. Strickland addresses only "the
Sixth Amendment guarantee of counsel." Id. at 691.
The right to self-representation and the right to effective assistance of counsel are
converse; "the exercise of the right of self-representation necessarily constitutes a
wavier of the right to counsel." Bakalov, 849 P.2d at 633 (opinion of Greenwood, J.).
Accord Frampton, 737 P.2d at 187; Hance v. Zant, 696 F.2d 940, 950 (11th Cir.),
cert, denied, 463 U.S. 1210 (1983), overruled on other grounds, Brooks v. Kemp, 762
F.2d 1383 (11th Cir. 1985). This is so even of a pro se defendant who at times defers
to standby counsel. Parker v. Norm, 859 F.Supp. 1203, 1227-28 (E.D. Ark. 1994),
18

rev'd on other grounds, 64 F.3d 1178 (8th Cir. 1995), cert, denied,

U.S.

, 116

S. Ct. 820 (1996).
Indeed, although appointment of standby counsel is a preferred practice, it is not
mandatory. United States v.Padilla, 819 F.2d at 952, 959 (10th Cir. 1987). See also
Faretta, All U.S. at 834 n. 46 ("Of course, a State may . . . appoint a 'standby
counsel' to aid the accused . . .") (emphasis added). Since defendant has no right to
standby counsel, he certainly has no right to effective standby counsel.
In short, there exists "no constitutional right to effective assistance of standby
counsel." United States v. Windsor, 981 F.2d 943, 947 (7th Cir. 1992) ("This court
knows" of no such right). Accordingly, defendant's claim is unsupported in law.
Moreover, defendant fails to establish that his standby counsel labored under a
conflict of interest. Defendant points only to his own pretrial statement that he did not
think Mr. Albright was prepared to go to trial. Br. of Aplt. at 42. 5 This remark, even
if true, would not establish a conflict of interest. An actual conflict of interest, and
thus a presumption of prejudice, will be found "only if the defendant demonstrates that
counsel 'actively represented conflicting interests' and that 'an actual conflict of interest
adversely affected his lawyer's performance.'* Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692 (citation

5

Defendant later retreated to the position that Mr. Albright "has been prepared, but he
hasn't prepared me" (R. 96). In fact, defendant appeared to be well prepared to mount his
defense tha: the crime was committed by someone other than himself. He to put on his
defense through his codefendant without the risk of taking the stand himself (see R. 369-71).
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omitted). Defendant has made no such demonstration here. Consequently, his claim is
unsupported in fact as well as law. There was no error here, plain or otherwise.
CONCLUSION
Defendant's conviction and sentence should be affirmed.
ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED OPINION REQUESTED
The State believes that oral argument may aid the decisional process in this case.
It also recommends publishing an opinion to further define the law of waiver of counsel
and to make explicit in Utah that a defendant who waives counsel has no right to
effective assistance of standby counsel.

t
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would like you to congregate in the one furthest to your
right so you are away from the general traffic of the
courthouse.

There are restrooms and water fountains there

and that's where we would like you to congregate when we take
any recesses and when you return from lunch and those kind of
things.

So we will take a 10-minute recess at this time.
Those of you who were not selected are free to

leave at this time or you are welcome to stay.

What's going

to happen is when the jury comes back in 10 minutes, I am
going to instruct them on some law relative to what their
responsibility is.

Counsel will then make opening statements

and then we will begin taking evidence in this case.

So if

you want to stay and see how things happen you are welcome to
do that, but other than that, you are excused at this time.
Thank you for being here.

Court will be in recess.

(Whereupon a recess was taken.)
(Whereupon these matters were held in chambers.)
MR. MURPHY:

Mr. McDonald has asked to talk to

THE COURT:

We are in chambers in the matter of

you, Judge

State of Utah vs. Perrv McDonald.

The defendant is present,

along with Mr. Albright and Carvel Harward from the Davis
County Attorney's Office.
Mr. McDonald?
MR. McDONALD:

Yes, your Honor.

I don't feel
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1

that I'm being properly counseled or as a lawyer being, you

2

know, as far as discussing the matter, because for a fact,

3

number one, he did not get in touch with me any time during

4

the week to even discuss or go over things.

5

know, like I come to court now, just to go to trial, then he

6

comes am j says this and that, but we did not go over no

7

battle plans or any such thing.
Then, two, the DA brings in <-oats and jackets

8
9

He just, you

that he <jid not prevail doing in my pre!"iminary hearing, and
My lawyer did not

10

that I am not getting proper counseling.

11

go over i any kind of battle plans or get me prepared for

12

this.

13

I didn't want to take it.

14

common battle plans to me.

15

think he is not prepared to go on in this case right now.

H<B was going to make me a bargain , which I did not

16

THE COURT:

17

MR. ALBRIGHT:

—

So he did not come and discuss no
I am not prepared.

I really

Mr., Albright.
Your Honor, I take a position

18

opposite to that, and that puts me in an awkward situation,

19

because :I am here to represent him.

20
21
22

THE COURT:

You need to represent what your

efforts 1nave been.
MR. ALBRIGHT:

Okay.

I have been to the jail at

23

least thi^ee times to visit him and discuss the case.

24

provided him with all the police reports , all preliminary

25

hearing transcripts, and I have reviewed all of that material

I
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1

with him.

I have taken at least eight phone calls collect

2

from him at my own expense, paid for those phone calls.

3

have had at least a half dozen phone calls from relatives.

4

have had —

5

relatives regarding the case, and they have relayed messages

6

to me from him when they felt that it was appropriate.

7

discussed the plea bargain about three or four days

8

beforehand with a jail visit.

9

take the plea.

I
I

and I have been happy to talk to all his

We

He informed me he was going to

I talked to him before we went into court and

10

I sat down and we reviewed all the evidence one more time and

11

he, at that time, told me he would take the plea.

12

went into court he changed his mind, which is his right, and

13

decided at that time that he would go to trial.

14

When we

I am prepared at this time, because of our

15

previous —

my previous jail visits, previously going over

16

the preliminary hearing transcript and all of the police

17

reports, which also I did do, I did personally do the

18

preliminary hearing, so I have seen the evidence.

19

Mr. Harward numerous times on this.

20

me with full access to his file, which he has had an open

21

file.

22

reviewed the complete file, and I have had probably three or

23

four conversations, two of which I have sat down and in Mr.

24

Harward's office to review the evidence that he would be

25

presenting.

I met with

In fact, he has provided

I have been to his office at least three times and

In fact, I think it was two days ago that Mr.
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Harward and myself reviewed completely his case in chief, and
I also at that time discussed with him what my plan was of
the evidence that I would present during the trial and my
theory of the case.

So we have —

my relationship with the

prosecutor's office has been full disclosure and I have been
prepared on this matter as of last week.
THE COURT:

Mr. McDonald?

MR. McDONALD:

Just like he said, he has been

prepared, but he hasn't prepared me.

I am the one that is

going to have to go up and do a five to life.
THE COURT:

I don't know what more preparation

you would make, Mr. McDonald.
MR. McDONALD:
THE COURT:

Are you going to testify?

Yes, sir.

Well, then, you have a right to go

over that and there is plenty of time to do that
MR. McDONALD:

Do I have the right to go

question, myself, the people that he puts on the stand?
THE COURT:

You can act as your own attorney if

you want to.
MR. McDONALD:

Okay

MR. ALBRIGHT:

I would be happy to sit there and

advise him throughout the trial, your Honor, if he prefers to
represent himself.
THE COURT:

Do you prefer to represent yourself?

MR. McDONALD:

Yes, sir.
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1

THE COURT:

I will allow you to do that and make

2

your questioning.

You need to understand, however, that you

3

will be required to abide by the same rules of evidence as

4

any attorney would be.

Have you been to court before?

5

MR. MCDONALD:

6

THE COURT:

7

before?

8
9

How many times have you been in court

Have you been through a trial?
MR. McDONALD:

I have seen a trial before, yes, I

have.

10
11

Yes.

THE COURT:

Have you personally been involved in

one?

12

MR. McDONALD:

13

THE COURT:

Yes.

Have you been there when questions

14

were asked and responses were given?

15

MR. McDONALD:

16

THE COURT:

17

You have some knowledge then of the

rules of evidence?

18

MR. McDONALD:

19

THE COURT:

20

Yes, your Honor.

Yes, sir.

And you know what's required in that

regard?

21

MR. McDONALD:

22

THE COURT:

Yes.

You realize that this is a serious

23

case and that the evidence that would be presented is going

24

to be critical in this matter?

25

MR. McDONALD:

Yes.
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THE COURT:

Knowing that, is it still your desire

to proceed and act as your own attorney?
MR. MCDONALD:
THE COURT:

Yes.

How much education have you had, Mr.

McDonald?
MR. McDONALD:
THE COURT:

From what?

MR. McDONALD:
THE COURT:

From high school.

Have you had any college experience?

MR. McDONALD:
THE COURT:

I graduated, your Honor.

No, sir.

Do you read, write and understand the

English language?
MR. McDONALD:
THE COURT:

Yes.

And you appear to be very articulate,

is that true?
MR. McDONALD:
THE COURT:

Yes.

Well, you have a right to act as

your own attorney, but I will ask Mr. Albright to be here.
MR. McDONALD:

Yes.

I would like for him to be

there.
THE COURT:

Would you like him to make your

opening argument for you?
MR. McDONALD:
THE COURT:
will ask you to —

Yes, sir.

All right.

You can proceed and I

you may ask questions or may ask him to
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1

ask them for you, however you feel most comfortable.

2

MR. MCDONALD:

3

THE COURT:

4

Okay.

But he will remain there and be there

to assist you at any time.

5

MR. MCDONALD:

6

THE COURT:

71

MR. HARWARD:

Okay.

Mr. Harward?
Yes, your Honor.

I am the

8

prosecutor who approved the filing of this case.

I've

9

considered it an important case since I first became aware of

10

it.

Three people were charged, the two defendants before the

11

Court today.

12

a preliminary hearing at the Circuit Court for Cal Johnson,

13

and I know in connection with that hearing, Mr. Albright had

14

a great interest.

15

Albright in connection with that hearing.

16

hearing for the defendant now before the Court was set and

17

continued.

18

contact with Mr. Albright, shared with him information.

The third defendant is Cal Johnson.

There was

I shared some information with Mr.

Each time I was prepared.

The preliminary

Each time I had

19

One of the complaints Mr. McDonald expressed a

20

few moments ago is he now is learning of some evidence for

21

the first time that wasn't presented at the preliminary

22

hearing.

23

had marked and had offered several exhibits.

24

same exhibits today.

25

exhibits at the preliminary hearing that we have available

At the preliminary hearing in his case, the State
Some are the

But we did introduce all of the
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today.
During the course of the investigation of this
case, the police gathered many items.

Mr. Albright has had a

list and has explained to him all of the evidence.

It has

been brought to the courthouse today and I've selected 19
different articles that I am going to use for evidence.

One

of the concerns Mr. McDonald has is on a list that I had
prepared, I have item no. 14, which is identified as a jacket
with a Raiders on it, and I have in parentheses, "Dwayne was
wearing."

That's an inadvertence on my part.

Before we

came into chambers a few minutes ago, I shared with Mr.
Albright and Mr. Murphy my inadvertence.

We expect the

evidence will show that Mr. McDonald was wearing that.
That's consistent with the police reports and the
information that Mr. Albright has had prior to today.

Mr.

McDonald was concerned that now we are switching evidence
right at the last moment.

That is a typographical

inadvertence.
THE COURT:

You need to realize, Mr. McDonald,

what they say evidence is doesn't necessarily mean what it is
or what conclusion they are going to —
from it.

the jury is drawing

They are going to have to prove beyond a reasonable

doubt out there what they say.
or to the jury.

It makes no difference to me

They have got to prove it.

MR. MCDONALD:

Okay.
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1

MR. HARWARD:

There is one other thing I want to

2

say in conclusion.

It is true that Mr. Albright, as already

3

reported, has contacted me several times.

4

talks a lot, and I have shared my personal observation about

5

the case, the strategy that I intend to follow, and I know

6

that he was prepared, even before the preliminary hearing, to

7

meet the State's evidence, and it was a fairly long

8

preliminary, and I know that he has been diligent in his

9

efforts in becoming aware of the case, which considered legal

I am a person who

10

issues in the case, and otherwise has been very active in

11

working on the matter.

12

THE COURT:

The Court would find that this matter

13

went to preliminary hearing, and that the defendant was

14

represented by Mr. Albright at the preliminary hearing.

15

evidence has been disclosed through an open door policy at

16

the County Attorney's Office, and there is no evidence which

17

is not known to the defendant through his counsel.

18

would further find that defense counsel has met with the

19

defendant on numerous occasions, has talked with family

20

members and all others who have had information in this

21

matter, and is fully prepared to go to trial today and is

22

acting as adequate counsel, in fact, probably more than

23

adequate under the law.

24
25

All

The Court

The Court would find that he is present and I
will direct counsel to remain at counsel table with Mr.

McDonald in the event he wishes to consult with him or have
him participate in any part of the trial.

Mr. McDonald has

requested that he make the opening statement, and as the
trial goes along, you can elect whether you want to
cross-examine or you want Mr. Albright to, Mr. McDonald, but
you both can't do it on a particular witness.

If he starts

out and there are other questions you want him to ask, you
are welcome to convey those to him, but I won't let you
cross-examine and then Mr. Albright cross-examine.

See what

I'm saying?
MR. McDONALD:
THE COURT:

I understand, your Honor.

That's just to cut down stress on

witnesses, really, and to keep order in the courtroom.
MR. McDONALD:
THE COURT:
right.

Okay.

All right.

Are you ready to go?

All

Thank you.
MR. ALBRIGHT:
MR. HARWARD:

Thank you.
Thank you.

MR. McDONALD:

Thank you.

(Whereupon a recess was taken.)
(Whereupon these matters were held in chambers.)
THE COURT:

We are in chambers in the matter of

State of Utah vs. Dwavne Johnson.

The State is present and

represented by Mr. Harward, and Mr. Johnson is present and
represented by Mr. Murphy.
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